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APPLYING THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE TO GUN 
RIGHTS: A FRAMEWORK TO DEPOLARIZE THE DEBATE AND 
STRENGTHEN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 
MOHAMED AKRAM FAIZER* 
SYNOPSIS 
Americans own a staggering 300 million plus firearms.1 The vast majority 
of the weapons are used safely and properly for recreation and self-defense 
purposes.2 However, firearms are often used improperly and subject Americans 
to a level of gun violence that is unique for an advanced democracy.3 Because 
this violence disproportionately effects urban and racial minority Americans, 
significant geographical and political polarization has arisen on the gun rights 
issue.4 Rural and conservative Americans tend to be gun owners who are highly 
protective of broad gun rights, while the complete opposite is the case for urban 
and racial minority Americans.5 This polarization harms political discourse and 
minimizes the likelihood of finding bipartisan compromise as to the appropriate 
 
* Mohamed Akram Faizer is Professor of Law at the Lincoln Memorial University Duncan School 
of Law in Knoxville, TN. Professor Faizer would very much like to thank Ann Walsh Long, LMU 
DSOL’s Head of Research and Digital Collections/Assistant Professor of Law and members of the 
St. Louis University Law Journal who helped him prepare this piece for publication. He would also 
like to thank his wife, Melanie Faizer, for her support throughout. 
 1. Christopher Ingraham, There are More Guns Than People in the United States According 
to a New Study of Global Firearm Ownership, WASH. POST (June 19, 2018), https://www.washing 
tonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/06/19/there-are-more-guns-than-people-in-the-united-states-
according-to-a-new-study-of-global-firearm-ownership/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.15e45e909 
8b1 [https://perma.cc/PB5Q-LXC7] (citing the findings of a Congressional Research Service report 
and the 2017 Small Arms Survey that report more than 393 million civilian-owned firearms in the 
United States). 
 2. Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Guns in America: National Survey on Private Ownership 
and Use of Firearms, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, May 1997, at 2–3. 
 3. Cassandra K. Crifasi et al., Storage Practices of U.S. Gun Owners in 2016, 108 AM. J. 
PUB. HEALTH 532, 532 (2018); German Lopez, America is One of 6 Countries That Make Up More 
Than Half of Gun Deaths Worldwide, VOX (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/8/29/177 
92776/us-gun-deaths-global [https://perma.cc/Q7RA-FHXY]. 
 4. Ruth Igielnik, Rural and Urban Gun Owners Have Different Experiences, Views on Gun 
Policy, PEW RES. CTR. FACTTANK (July 10, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/ 
07/10/rural-and-urban-gun-owners-have-different-experiences-views-on-gun-policy/ [https://per 
ma.cc/7ZLW-SYVF]. 
 5. Id. 
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level of gun regulation. The U.S. Supreme Court chose to needlessly interpose 
itself into the gun rights debate in District of Columbia v. Heller6 and McDonald 
v. City of Chicago,7 which concluded that the Second Amendment protects an 
individual’s right to possess handguns for self-defense purposes in the home and 
that this right is made applicable to state and local governments by way of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Since these decisions, 
polarization on the issue of gun rights has only worsened8 and the federal courts 
are increasingly preoccupied with challenges to municipal and state gun 
restrictions on Second and Fourteenth Amendment grounds.9  
My argument is that the federal judiciary can protect itself from continued 
polarization on the gun rights issue by revisiting McDonald and incorporating 
the Second Amendment against state and local governments by way of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause.10 Doing so would 
adumbrate a bipartisan compromise that protects federalism and legitimizes both 
perspectives on the gun rights debate because use of the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause, as opposed to the Due Process Clause, enables the federal courts to bring 
nuance to the issue by granting state and local governments broad discretion to 
regulate guns, provided they take adequate steps to accommodate the self-
defense rights of all citizens. This way, all citizens, including historically 
marginalized racial and ethnic minorities, will be provided a level of safety 
consistent with U.S. citizenship. My approach will reduce polarization 
surrounding the gun rights debate, strengthen the federal judiciary, and, 
ultimately, engender national cohesion.  
 
 6. 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
 7. 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010). 
 8. Obvious examples being the U.S. Senate’s refusal to grant Judge Merrick Garland a 
hearing after he was nominated by former President Obama to replace the late Justice Antonin 
Scalia on the U.S. Supreme Court and the parlous treatment of Associate Justice Brett Kavanaugh 
during his confirmation hearings to replace former Justice Anthony Kennedy. 
 9. E.g., N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 269 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(unsuccessful challenge brought to New York and Connecticut’s ban on semiautomatic weapons); 
see also Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 407, 412 (7th Cir. 2015) (affirming the 
City of Highland Park’s assault weapons ban); Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 138–39 (4th Cir. 
2017) (the en banc Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a divided panel of the same court to 
conclude that Maryland’s Firearm Safety Act satisfied strict scrutiny); but see Wrenn v. District of 
Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 664 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (concluding that a D.C. ordinance that limited 
concealed carry permits to those with special needs violates the Second Amendment). 
 10. This is because the Court’s due process jurisprudence requires jot-by-jot incorporation of 
the relevant Bill of Rights provision, whereas incorporation via the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
would grant states greater leeway to be effective laboratories of democracy while recognizing gun 
rights. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Working in a beautiful law school building in historic downtown Knoxville, 
Tennessee, I am privileged to work with, teach, and meet Americans of all 
political persuasions. Many of my colleagues, students, and friends are classic 
“red state” conservatives whose support for President Trump is based largely on 
a concern about protecting individual gun rights and insuring a conservative 
majority in the federal courts. My liberal students, colleagues and friends often 
cite their opposition to these goals as their reason for opposing the President’s 
reelection. In short, pronounced partisanship on gun rights and the federal 
judiciary explain much of the nation’s political divide. The U.S. Supreme Court 
interposed itself into the highly charged gun rights debate in District of 
Columbia v. Heller11 and McDonald v. City of Chicago,12 which concluded that 
the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to possess handguns for 
self-defense purposes in the home, and that this right is made applicable to state 
and local governments by way of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause.13 These judicial interventions were untimely in that they will satisfy 
neither side of the gun rights debate and only exacerbate the polarization 
problem that affects the federal judiciary. A cautionary reminder for all of us is 
the pronounced polarization on reproductive rights and judicial review that 
followed the judiciary’s creation of abortion rights based on a very broad 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.14 This was 
the perspective of none other than Associate Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, who stated that state laws liberalizing abortion were needlessly 
preempted by the Court’s decision to make abortion a national right.15 My 
concern is that we are needlessly compounding this problem in the area of gun 
rights, an area left to the political branches until the Heller and McDonald 
decisions. The result has been the further politicization of the judiciary and 
worsened political polarization on gun rights nationwide.  
My recommendation is that the federal courts reverse course by 
incorporating gun rights against the states by way of the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as opposed to the Due Process Clause. 
Such an approach will enable the courts to consider local conditions in 
evaluating the constitutionality of gun restrictions by empowering them to 
balance the restrictions imposed, including how they affect racial minority and 
 
 11. 554 U.S. at 635. 
 12. 561 U.S. at 791. 
 13. See supra notes 11–12. 
 14. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833 (1992). 
 15. Joshua Zeitz, Why Conservatives Should Beware a Roe v. Wade Repeal, POLITICO, (Sept. 
4, 2018), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/09/04/kavanaugh-roe-v-wade-conserva 
tives-beware-backlash-219623 [https://perma.cc/8GAJ-NPBT]. 
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other distressed communities, against local jurisdictions’ effectiveness in 
protecting citizens from crime and violence in all its forms. This means of 
evaluating gun rights will appeal to a broader constituency of Americans than 
the current Due Process jot-by-jot approach because it legitimizes and 
effectuates the different perspectives in the current rights debate, while 
preserving and incentivizing the states to be legitimate laboratories of 
democracy on the issue. It will also, potentially, stem what has been an 
inexorable tendency to hyper-politicize the federal judiciary and therefore 
engender national cohesion.  
AMERICA TODAY: HIGH LEVELS OF GUN OWNERSHIP IN A POLITICALLY 
POLARIZED ENVIRONMENT 
America’s high gun ownership rate means that Americans possess 
approximately 121 firearms per 100 persons.16 This is 3.5 times the gun 
ownership rate of Canada, four times the gun ownership rate of Austria, Norway, 
and Switzerland, and five times the gun ownership rate found in New Zealand, 
Sweden, France, and Germany.17 The vast majority of weapons owned by 
Americans are used lawfully for recreation and self-defense purposes and only 
a tiny fraction of these weapons are misused to perpetrate violence.18 The U.S., 
however, does suffer from a substantial gun violence problem that makes it an 
outlier among first-world democracies. More than 115,000 Americans are shot 
each year and approximately 40,000 are killed by guns.19 Of these deaths, more 
than 23,000 are suicides.20 Roughly half the suicides in the U.S., which is the 
nation’s tenth leading cause of death, are caused by gun shots.21 The number of 
gun deaths is now roughly equal to the number of annual roadway deaths 
 
 16. Carol Schaeffer, US Citizens Own 40% of All Guns in World—More than Next 25 Top-
Ranked Countries Combined Study Suggests, INDEPENDENT (June 19, 2018), https://www.indepen 
dent.co.uk/news/world/americas/gun-ownership-country-us-legal-firearm-citizens-statistics-a840 
6941.html [https://perma.cc/63KK-KFGW]. 
 17. AARON KARP, SMALL ARMS SURVEY, ESTIMATING GLOBAL CIVILIAN-HELD FIREARMS 
NUMBERS 4 tbl.2 (2018). 
 18. Cook & Ludwig, supra note 2, at 2–3. The Bureau of Justice tracks statistics on the number 
of guns are used for crime, mass shootings, etc. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 243035, 
HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES KNOWN TO LAW ENFORCEMENT, 1 (Dec. 2013) (data 
collected from 1992–2011). 
 19. Facts and Figures, UC DAVIS HEALTH, https://health.ucdavis.edu/what-you-can-
do/facts.html [https://perma.cc/JZH5-9ZCY]. 
 20. Melonie Heron, Deaths: Leading Causes for 2017, NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP. 51 tbl. 11 
(2019), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr68/nvsr68_06-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PMJ-R 
YZ2] (The number of motor vehicle traffic deaths for 2016 was 38,659, compared with the number 
of all firearm-related deaths, which was 39,773.). 
 21. Melonie Heron, Deaths: Leading Causes for 2016, NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP. 17 tbl.1 
(2018), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr67/nvsr67_06.pdf [https://perma.cc/BY5K-EG 
R3]. 
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nationwide.22 To those who understandably claim guns are necessary to protect 
against criminals and home intruders, the evidence demonstrates that gun 
ownership increases the likelihood of deaths caused by accident, suicide, and 
theft.23 Guns kept in the home correlate with a five-fold increase in suicide, a 
four-fold increase in accidental shooting, and a seven-fold increase in 
homicide.24  
The U.S.’s gun death rate makes it, by far, the laggard among developed 
countries in terms of minimizing gun fatalities.25 The U.S.’s gun death rate of 
10.6 per 100,000 annually is dramatically higher than the rates of other 
developed nations that have stricter gun laws and have less violent cultures.26 
Switzerland’s gun death rate of 2.8 per 100,000, which is amongst the highest in 
Western Europe, is less than a third of the gun death rate in the U.S.27 The rates 
for Canada, Germany, the U.K., and Japan are 2.1, 0.9, 0.3, and 0.2 
respectively.28  
Additionally, blaming the U.S.’s high gun death rate on mental illness is 
wrong.29 The evidence demonstrates that the U.S. population does not suffer 
from higher rates of mental illness than other mature democracies and there is 
no correlation between mental illness and gun homicides.30 Rather, the U.S. 
suffers from an inordinately high rate of gun violence that is attributable to high 
rates of gun ownership, in conjunction with an atypical culture of self-reliance.31  
 
 22. Neal E. Boudette, U.S. Traffic Deaths Rise for a Second Straight Year, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/15/business/highway-traffic-safety.html [https://per 
ma.cc/AHS2-J778]. 
 23. Melinda Wenner Moyer, More Guns Do Not Stop More Crimes Evidence Shows, 
SCIENTIFIC AM. (Oct. 1, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/more-guns-do-not-stop 
-more-crimes-evidence-shows/ [https://perma.cc/Y98K-G5U8]. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Lopez, supra note 3. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See e.g., Fareed Zakaria, Talking About Mental Health After Mass Shootings is a Cop-Out, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/talking-about-mental-
health-after-mass-shootings-is-a-cop-out/2017/10/05/8c319ca4-aa13-11e7-850e-2bdd1236be5d_ 
story.html?utm_term=.ca58196fc4d3 [https://perma.cc/H6GM-Y75D]. 
 30. Emma E. McGinty, Mental Illness and Gun Violence: Disrupting the Narrative, 
PSYCHIATRIC SERV. (June 20, 2018), https://ps.psychiatryonline.org/doi/10.1176/appi.ps.201800 
172 [https://perma.cc/FSK3-R78X]. 
 31. See e.g., German Lopez, America’s Unique Gun Violence Problem, Explained in 16 Maps 
and Charts, VOX (Aug. 31, 2019), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/10/2/16399418/ 
us-gun-violence-statistics-maps-charts [https://perma.cc/A472-VXZG]; see also Dave Gilson, 10 
Pro-Gun Myths, Shot Down, MOTHER JONES (Jan. 31, 2013), https://www.motherjones.com/poli 
tics/2013/01/pro-gun-myths-fact-check/ [https://perma.cc/YLE8-TNMS] (“People with access to 
more guns tend to kill more people—with guns. States with higher gun ownership rates have higher 
gun murder rates—as much as 114 percent higher than states with lower gun ownership rates.”) 
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The vast majority of Americans, however, do not own guns for improper 
purposes. Rather, most guns are used properly and safely for self-defense and 
recreation purposes. Gun ownership is, to many, as American as charitable 
giving or apple pie. This cultural disposition in favor of gun ownership explains 
why many Americans have taken such an expansive view of the Second 
Amendment and have joined civil society interest groups such as the National 
Rifle Association, which claims to have 5 million members.32 Indeed, regardless 
of the objective metrics, gun ownership is a chosen means of self-defense for 
many Americans and it would be foolhardy and counterproductive for any level 
of government to systematically disarm gun owners or deny them ammunition.33  
Gun rights, however, have historically been abused both to subject racial 
minority communities to systematic gun violence, and to deprive those 
communities of access to guns for self-defense purposes.34 This paradigm of 
loose gun restrictions for the white majority community, in conjunction with the 
systemic disarming of racial minorities, has, of course, worsened the pronounced 
polarization of the gun rights debate.  
A proper public policy remedy would have to balance the public’s “love of 
guns” born of a hyper-individualistic culture, especially in rural America, with 
urban America’s preference for gun restrictions. It would also consider the fact 
that many Americans, especially racial minorities and those living in urban 
areas, increasingly see broad gun rights, in conjunction with the lack of 
economic development and ineffective crime control, as a means of effectively 
undermining struggling communities.35  
I.  DEPOLITICIZING GUN RIGHTS BY REVISITING HELLER AND MCDONALD 
In view of pronounced polarization surrounding the gun rights debate, it was 
a mistake for the Court to issue its Heller and McDonald decisions. The Court 
should limit these cases to their facts and instead conclude that the public’s right 
to bear arms should be incorporated against state and local governments by way 
 
However, gun possession in view of the manifest dangers is not irrational. Rather, it is akin to 
driving for those afraid of flying. 
 32. Ryan Sit, How Big is the NRA? Gun Group’s Membership Might Not Be As Powerful As 
It Says, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.newsweek.com/nra-membership-5-million-mem 
bers-analysis-842040 [https://perma.cc/738C-HAP4]. 
 33. I say foolhardy because such a measure would most likely result in either violence or civil 
disobedience. 
 34. Examples include denial of guns to those with criminal background problems and other 
more invidious forms of discrimination. 
 35. Trymaine Lee, The Age of Trump is Producing More Black Gun Owners, NBC NEWS, 
(May 12, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/age-trump-producing-more-black-gun-
owners-n758211 [https://perma.cc/4DDB-W3GZ] (“While no agency or group keeps track of gun 
sales by race, interviews with firearms dealers and gun clubs across the country strongly suggest a 
sharp rise in the number of African-Americans buying guns since Trump’s election.”). 
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of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and not 
the Due Process Clause. This will ideally recognize the different narratives 
surrounding the gun debate to further effectuate the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
goal of protecting human freedom consistent with Madisonian federalism. It 
would also, ideally, depoliticize the federal judiciary and help cohere the nation. 
A. Evaluating the Court’s Jurisprudence 
The Supreme Court’s decisions should not solely be evaluated according to 
the apparent desirability of the judicial outcomes, but also according to the 
institutional legitimacy of these outcomes, the legal soundness of the Court’s 
jurisprudence, and, finally, to how these decisions will affect and interact with 
both U.S. government and society. The standard for evaluating the legitimacy of 
federal court oversight was adumbrated by Justice Brandeis’s Ashwander 
Rules,36 set forth in his concurring opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley 
 
 36. See id. The Ashwander Rules are as follows: 
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-
adversary, proceeding, declining because to decide such questions “is legitimate 
only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and 
vital controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a 
friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry 
as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.” 
2. The Court will not “anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the 
necessity of deciding it.” “It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a 
constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.” 
3. The Court will not “formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required 
by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.” 
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented 
by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may 
be disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be 
decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other 
a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the 
latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a 
question under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because the 
judgment can be sustained on an independent state ground. 
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who 
fails to show that he is injured by its operation. Among the many applications of 
this rule, none is more striking than the denial of the right to challenge to one who 
lacks a personal or property right. . . . 
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one 
who has availed himself of its benefits. 
7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a 
serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court 
will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which 
the question may be avoided. 
Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
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Authority.37 The most important of these is that the Court should abjure from 
adjudicating the constitutionality of an issue unless it is absolutely necessary to 
resolve the case.38 This is to minimize the footprint of the appointed federal 
judiciary and allow for the Framers’ laboratories of democracy to flourish. 
Justice Brandeis’s admonition is especially relevant to the issue of gun rights in 
view of its political saliency and the risk of further politicizing the federal 
judiciary. This was the unfortunate result of the Court’s creation of nationwide 
abortion rights under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Justice 
Ginsburg, no less, has argued that it had the parlous consequence of creating 
sharp divisions on the abortion issue at the very moment when states were 
liberalizing their abortion laws.39 Applying this framework, the Court’s 
decisions jurisprudentially protecting gun rights are altogether problematic uses 
of judicial review. They were unnecessary judicial interventions that anticipate 
a one-way ratchet to effectively preclude state and local governments from 
regulating guns to minimize the risk of gun violence. This, in turn, will harm 
U.S. society by increasing the level of gun violence, further polarizing the gun 
debate and needlessly damaging the Court’s institutional legitimacy.  
A better approach would be to conclude that the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Privileges or Immunities Clause grants all Americans a right to greater freedom 
and liberty as against all levels of governments and still allow for effective gun 
regulation at the state and local level. Firearms are valued for self-defense 
purposes, but their misuse imposes significant dangers to human freedom that 
can undermine the value of American citizenship. Under my approach, federal 
courts will be empowered to apply the Privileges or Immunities Clause as 
against state and local governments that systematically deny the broader public, 
including historically oppressed minorities, their self and collective defense 
rights. Conversely, though, state and local governments that provide non-
discriminatory policing and adequate safety to their citizens are to be given 
broader leeway under the Clause to implement reasonable gun regulations to 
protect against all forms of firearm misuse, including suicide. This will satisfy 
the Fourteenth Amendment Framers’ goal of enhancing the value of American 
citizenship and, ultimately, depoliticize the gun rights debate. The U.S. Supreme 
Court has lamentably failed to take this approach and has instead chosen to 
nationalize gun rights via the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  
 
 37. 297 U.S. 288, 346–48 (1936). 
 38. See id. at 347. 
 39. See Jonathan Bullington, Justice Ginsburg: Roe v. Wade Not ‘Woman-Centered’, CHI. 
TRIB. (May 11, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-05-11/news/chi-justice-ginsburg-
roe-v-wade-not-womancentered-20130511_1_roe-v-abortion-related-cases-wade-case [https://per 
ma.cc/Y7MG-F6RS]. 
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B. Heller and McDonald 
Disregarding over two hundred years of judicial restraint on the issue, the 
U.S. Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Heller waded into the gun debate 
to conclude that the District of Columbia violated the Second Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution when it banned the possession of unregistered firearms and 
disallowed the registration of handguns.40 The Court, in an opinion by the late 
Justice Scalia, looked to grammar, eighteenth century texts, historical 
commentaries, cases, and legislative materials to conclude that that there is a 
personal right to possess firearms that are commonly used by the American 
public for self-defense purposes.41 Comfortable with a right extending beyond 
militia service, the decision concluded that D.C.’s ban on handgun possession in 
the home, coupled with a prohibition rendering any lawful firearm in the home 
inoperable for immediate self-defense purposes, violated the Second 
Amendment.42 The Court concluded that the central component of the right itself 
was not militia service per se, but self-defense, and held that because handguns 
are the most commonly used weapon by American households for self-defense, 
the District’s handgun ban violated the Second Amendment.43  
Although a stunning victory for gun-rights enthusiasts, Heller concurrently 
created problems for Second Amendment advocates. First, the Heller decision 
was silent on the level of scrutiny that applies to gun restrictions.44 Second, the 
Court concluded that nothing in its decision precludes local governments from 
denying weapons to those traditionally denied them, including convicted felons 
and the mentally ill.45 As noted in Justice Breyer’s dissent, convicts and the 
mentally ill are typically not denied other Bill of Rights provisions such as those 
found in the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments.46 Finally, the Court 
majority disregarded evidence presented to the D.C. City Council that handguns 
are actually an ineffective means of self-defense, e.g., handguns in the home are 
more than four times more likely to be accidentally misused against a family 
member than purposely used against a home invader.47 
Notwithstanding these omissions and limitations, the Court in McDonald48 
invalidated a Chicago municipal ordinance that prohibited handgun possession 
in the home by incorporating, for the first time, Heller’s understanding of a 
personal right to a firearm for self-defense purposes as against state and local 
 
 40. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
 41. Id. at 598, 605, 614, 634–35; see also Anthony P. Badaracco, Firearm Federalism, 65 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 761, 777 (2010). 
 42. Badaracco, supra note 41, at 778. 
 43. Heller, 554 U.S. at 629. 
 44. Id. at 635. 
 45. Id. at 626–27. 
 46. Id. at 721. 
 47. Id. at 694. 
 48. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
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governments by way of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.49 As 
set forth more fully below, use of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as opposed to the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the same 
amendment is not only mistaken, but has deprived the Court of an opportunity 
to effectively protect gun rights consistent with federalism. It is to the issue of 
federalism and its benefits to which this paper now turns. 
II.  THE TENTH AMENDMENT, FEDERALISM, AND ITS BENEFITS 
The Tenth Amendment provides “[t]he powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people.”50 It has historically been seen as a reminder 
that the American system of federalism provides the Federal Government with 
limited and enumerated powers, with the several states retaining broad police 
powers to govern themselves as autonomous entities. Although the states 
“surrendered many of their powers to the new Federal Government, they 
retained a residuary and inviolable sovereignty.”51  
Maintaining individual state sovereignty was imperative for the Founders 
because it insured that the several states would remain “laboratories of 
democracy” that could effectively vie for the American people’s affections and 
thereby minimize the risk of oppression by any one governmental entity. The 
Framers were aware of the need to institutionalize the Nation’s federalism and 
did so by 1) giving the national Congress only limited and enumerated powers 
under the Constitution’s Article I;52 2) giving States a disproportionate power in 
the Senate and in electing the Nation’s President under Article II;53 3) ensuring 
the free movement of U.S. citizens under Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities 
Clause;54 and 4) ensuring the several States retained residual police powers by 
implication under Article I and explicitly under the Tenth Amendment.55  
The importance of federalism is outlined in New York v. United States, 
which involved a challenge brought by the State of New York to the take title 
provision of the federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act 
of 1985.56 This law was enacted at the behest of the National Governors’ 
 
 49. Id. at 752, 791. 
 50. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 51. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918–19 (1997) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 39 
(James Madison)) (internal quotations omitted). 
 52. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (provides that the Congress has limited and enumerated 
legislative power). 
 53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (mandates “two Senators from each State”); U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1 
(mandates Presidential elections via an electoral college of electors from each state as opposed to 
by nationwide popular vote). 
 54. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. 
 55. See U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 56. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 153–54 (1992). 
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Association to incentivize states to adequately provide for the disposal of 
radioactive waste generated within their borders.57 Two of the three incentives 
provided to states under the Act were monetary in nature, but the third incentive, 
known as the “take title” provision, provided that states are to take title to low-
level radioactive waste generated within their borders when they are unable to 
provide for the disposal of such waste upon the request of the owner or generator 
of such waste.58 In an opinion by former Justice O’Connor, the Court concluded 
this “take title” provision was an unconstitutional infringement of state 
sovereignty because it improperly coerced the state legislative process.59 The 
decision emphasized that the Constitution’s emphasis on federalism was not to 
protect state governments as political entities. Rather, Justice O’Connor writes: 
The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit of the 
States or state governments as abstract political entities, or even for the benefit 
of the public officials governing the States. To the contrary, the Constitution 
divides authority between federal and state governments for the protection of 
individuals. State sovereignty is not just an end in itself: “Rather, federalism 
secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign 
power.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 . . . (1991). “Just as the 
separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal 
Government serves to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one 
branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal 
Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.” 
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. at 458 . . . (1991).60 
Federalism’s healthy diffusion of power is for the protection of individuals and 
not a simple end in itself. This, in turn requires that state and local governments 
retain broad police powers as a supplement to federal constitutional rights.61 
Federalism, however, is threatened by broad application of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause to constrain state legislatures from 
effectively using their police powers. This is what the Court did in McDonald, 
where absent an absolute necessity to do so, it jurisprudentially expanded gun 
rights by incorporating the Heller definition of the Second Amendment rights. 
This coercion of a state’s legislative process by the least democratically 
accountable branch of the federal government both politicizes the federal 
judiciary and undermines national cohesion by polarizing the gun rights issue. 
My recommendation is to have the Court revisit its incorporation jurisprudence 
and instead use the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause, 
which prioritizes human freedom, to contextually apply the freedoms emanating 
 
 57. Id. at 150–51. 
 58. Id. at 153–54. 
 59. Id. at 176. 
 60. Id. at 181–82. 
 61. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 417 (1922) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
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from the Bill of Rights, including gun rights, to enhance the value of U.S. 
citizenship. Such an approach, as opposed to jot-by-jot incorporation by way of 
the Due Process Clause, will grant Americans their right to full citizenship while 
insuring States remain vibrant laboratories of democracy.  
III.  THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE — A MEANS OF 
INCORPORATING GUN RIGHTS 
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution’s Article IV, 
Section 2, ratified in 1788, provides that “[t]he Citizens of each State shall be 
entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”62 This 
informed the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities 
Clause (“Clause”), ratified in 1868, which provides that “[n]o State shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities or citizens 
of the United States.”63 The Clause has been mistakenly interpreted to mean 
little more than protection of foreign residents against state governments that 
attempt to deny them their the ability to earn a livelihood or to relocate and take 
up residency on equal terms.64 This mistaken marginalization of the Clause, 
attributable to the doctrine of judicial deference,65 goes back to The Slaughter-
House Cases.66 The Slaughter-House Cases, issued a mere four years after the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, concluded that the Clause provided no 
redress to New Orleans slaughterhouse operators against their own state 
government’s granting of a monopoly tariff to a competitor slaughterhouse 
because it would ostensibly empower the federal courts to be illegitimate 
overseers of state government.67 
 
 62. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
 63. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. For a detailed description of why this provision arguably 
can be the basis to judicially enforce socio-economic rights for all Americans, see M. Akram Faizer, 
The Privileges or Immunities Clause: A Potential Cure for the Trump Phenomenon, 121 PENN ST. 
L. REV. 61, 65 (2016). 
 64. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502, 507–08 (1999) (concluding that California could not 
impose a durational residency requirement before new residents could be entitled to full welfare 
benefits). 
 65. The doctrine of judicial deference refers to courts being reluctant to invalidate the actions 
of the other branches of government for fear of institutionally undermining the judiciary and 
antagonizing the political culture. By way of example, Chief Justice Roberts was accused by 
conservatives of excessive judicial deference when he found an ingenious means of concluding the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate was not a prohibited penalty under 
the Commerce Clause, but a constitutional means of raising revenue under the Taxing and Spending 
Clause in Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 668–69 (2012). 
 66. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 55, 80–81 (1873). 
 67. Id. at 78; see also Brief of Constitutional Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners at 31, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (No. 08–1521); Michael J. 
Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of Slaughter-House: A Critique of a Negative Rights View of the 
Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REV. 409, 429 (1990). 
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The Slaughter-House decision was immediately condemned by former 
members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress as a “great mistake,”68 which, according 
to U.S. Senator Timothy O. Howe, had perverted the Constitution by “assert[ing] 
a principle of constitutional law which [would never] be accepted by the [legal] 
profession or the people of the United States.”69 U.S. Senator George Franklin 
Edmunds said the Slaughter-House view of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Clause 
“radically differed” from the Framers’ intent.70 The Court’s reluctance to revisit 
this conclusion, although based on an interpretation that is “contrary to an 
overwhelming consensus among leading constitutional scholars today[] who 
agree that the opinion is egregiously wrong[,]”71 has distorted its jurisprudence 
by foreclosing the Clause as a means of reviewing unjust state laws in a manner 
consistent with federalism and has led to the current paradigm whereby the 
Court, being limited to the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses to protect 
individual rights, cannot properly balance gun and other rights in a manner 
consistent with federalism. 
The Clause should be reinterpreted to correctly apply its Framers’ intent to 
ensure that all citizens of the post-reconstruction republic be granted citizenship 
rights and living standards at the forefront of international standards. This 
requires rejecting the distinction between positive and negative rights, and 
requiring the federal government to protect the fundamental rights of all citizens 
against state action that undermines these rights.72 Because the Clause was 
enacted and ratified based on, among other things, revulsion at the institution of 
slavery and its consequences in the antebellum American South, its Framers, 
seeking to protect Americans from recalcitrant state and local government, 
sought to ensure provision of substantive negative and positive freedoms by all 
levels of government.73 The Clause should therefore be interpreted to provide 
all citizens with federally protected substantive rights, including but not limited 
to those found in the Bill of Rights.74 Although the Court rejected this approach 
and instead used the Due Process Clause to selectively incorporate the Bill of 
Rights over a more than one-hundred year time-frame that began a generation 
 
 68. Brief of Constitutional Law Professors, supra note 67, at 32–33 (quoting former U.S. 
Senator and Fourteenth Amendment Framer George S. Boutwell). 
 69. 43 CONG. REC. 4148 (1874). 
 70. See Brief of Constitutional Law Professors, supra note 67, at 33; see also MICHAEL KENT 
CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
177 (1986). 
 71. Brief of Constitutional Law Professors, supra note 67 at 33 (citing Amar, infra note 72, at 
631). 
 72. See Akhil Reed Amar, Substance and Method in the Year 2000, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 601, 
631–32 (2001); see also Gerhardt, supra note 67, at 437. 
 73. See Gerhardt, supra note 67, at 417. 
 74. See Brief of Constitutional Law Professors, supra note 67, at 16, 20. 
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after the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification,75 most legal scholars would 
agree this was a mistake that is belied by the Fourteenth Amendment’s text and 
its Framers’ intent.76 
Because the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment Clause intended to 
dramatically alter American federalism by imposing positive duties on all levels 
of government to enhance the value of American citizenship, it can be surmised 
that a concomitant of this requirement is to insure all Americans are provided 
with individual rights and material living conditions consistent with living in a 
free and democratic society.77 Consistent with Madisonian federalism, it also 
empowers state and local governments to effectively use their police powers to 
enhance the value of this citizenship. Included in this is the right to self-defense 
and to be free from violence, including gun violence.78  
IV.  MCDONALD’S FAILURE TO EFFECTUATE THE CLAUSE AND HOW THIS 
DISTORTS THE MEANING OF GUN RIGHTS 
In McDonald, the Court rejected an invitation to overturn the Slaughter-
House Cases and properly apply the Second Amendment as against the City of 
Chicago by way of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. It chose to, once again, 
rely on stare decisis to incorporate the Second Amendment by way of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. This is a highly consequential 
mistake because unlike the Privileges or Immunities Clause, which would 
textually authorize a nuanced approach to the issue of gun rights and citizenship, 
use of the Due Process Clause to jot-by-jot apply the Second Amendment against 
state and local governments precludes such nuance and requires application of 
 
 75. The Court first applied the Due Process Clause to incorporate the Fifth Amendment’s 
Takings Clause against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in Chi., 
Burlington and Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235 (1897), and it took another 
one hundred and thirteen years for the Court to conclude the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause required state and local governments to provide Second Amendment protections. See 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 792 (2010). 
 76. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Institute for Justice in Support of Petitioners at 8–9, McDonald 
v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (No. 08–1521); see also Anthony P. Badaracco, supra note 
41, at 762; Bryan H. Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: Revisiting the Original Meaning 
of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866–67, 68 OHIO ST. L. J. 1509, 1510 (2007); David S. Cohen, 
McDonald’s Paradoxical Legacy: State Restrictions of Non-Citizens’ Gun Rights, 71 MD. L. REV. 
1219, 1220 (2012). For a detailed description as to the Court’s mistaken marginalization of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause and its incorrect application of the Bill of Rights against the states 
via the Due Process Clause, see Faizer, supra note 63, at 64. 
 77. Gerhardt, supra note 67, at 427; see also Kenneth A. Klukowski, Citizen Gun Rights: 
Incorporating the Second Amendment Through the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 39 N.M. L. 
REV. 195, 221–22 (2009). 
 78. Klukowski, supra note 77, at 237 n.376. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2020] APPLYING THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE TO GUN RIGHTS 481 
strict scrutiny to evaluate state and local gun restrictions.79 Justice Alito, whose 
majority opinion in McDonald governs, writes: 
Finally, the Court abandoned “the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment 
applies to the States only a watered-down, subjective version of the individual 
guarantees of the Bill of Rights,” stating that it would be “incongruous” to apply 
different standards “depending on whether the claim was asserted in a state or 
federal court.” Malloy, 378 U.S., at 10–11 . . . (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Instead, the Court decisively held that incorporated Bill of Rights 
protections “are all to be enforced against the States under the Fourteenth 
Amendment according to the same standards that protect those personal rights 
against federal encroachment.” Id. at 10.80 
Accordingly, applying the Due Process framework, the Court presented the 
issue before it as whether the right to keep and bear arms is “fundamental to our 
scheme of ordered liberty, or as we have said in a related context, whether this 
right is deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”81 The Court 
concluded that the right to keep and bear arms is deeply rooted in the nation’s 
history and traditions based on many factors, including the value that the early 
colonists placed on gun ownership and the fact that Union Army commanders 
after the Civil War took steps to insure all Americans, including African 
Americans, had gun rights safe from state confiscation.82  
Justice Alito’s opinion, however, fails to acknowledge that gun rights, more 
than other rights, present an obvious tension between liberty and safety.83 This 
tension explains why most jurisdictions have historically denied firearms to 
convicted felons, the mentally ill, and others who might have greater self-
defense needs than the broader public.84 The inherent dangers attendant to 
firearm possession undoubtedly explain why other advanced democracies are far 
stricter with guns than the U.S., which, in turn, explains why the U.S. is an 
outlier with respect to its high rate of gun fatalities.85  
 
 79. Id. at 235–36. 
 80. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 765 (2010) (some internal citations omitted). 
 81. Id. at 767 (internal citations omitted, internal quotation marks omitted, emphasis original). 
 82. Id. at 773. 
 83. See supra notes 16–21. Guns are far more likely to be misused by their owner than properly 
against assailants and home intruders. 
 84. Categories of Prohibited People, GIFFORDS L. CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, 
https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/who-can-have-a-gun/categories-of-prohibit 
ed-people/ [https://perma.cc/QC7H-8TKY] (categories of prohibited people include: “those who 
have been convicted of violent or gun-related misdemeanors[,] those with a history of abusing 
alcohol or drugs[,] those convicted of juvenile offenses[,] and additional people who have suffered 
from severe mental illness.”). 
 85. Jonathan Masters, U.S. Gun Policy: Global Comparisons, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. 
(Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-gun-policy-global-comparisons [https://per 
ma.cc/NG38-56CL]. 
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Justice Alito’s decision also fails to appreciate that nationwide application 
of broad gun rights via the Due Process Clause on the grounds that they are “so 
rooted in our history, tradition, and practice as to require special protection” 
contradicts the Court’s previously enunciated grounds for heightened judicial 
scrutiny, i.e., there is no need for federal courts to expand the scope of 
constitutional rights where the basis for doing so is the presumed protection by 
the democratic process.86  
The McDonald majority completely disregards the fact that none of the Bill 
of Rights, including the Second Amendment, were intended to be nationalized 
by way of the Due Process Clause.87 Responding to the City of Chicago’s claim 
that textually applying the Second Amendment against state and local 
governments by way of the Due Process Clause undermines federalism by 
preventing state and local governments from enacting reasonable gun safety 
laws, Justice Alito writes: 
Unless we turn back the clock or adopt a special incorporation test applicable 
only to the Second Amendment, municipal respondents’ argument must be 
rejected. Under our precedents, if a Bill of Rights guarantee is fundamental from 
an American perspective, then, unless stare decisis counsels otherwise, that 
guarantee is fully binding on the States and thus limits (but by no means 
eliminates) their ability to devise solutions to social problems that suit local 
needs and values. As noted by the 38 States that have appeared in this case as 
amici supporting petitioners, “[s]tate and local experimentation with reasonable 
firearms regulations will continue under the Second Amendment.”88 
This, however, posits that application of gun rights to state and local 
governments requires a symmetrical textual application of Heller by way of the 
Due Process Clause. This is untrue.89 Justice Stevens writes in dissent: 
I do not mean to deny that there can be significant practical, as well as esthetic, 
benefits from treating rights symmetrically with regard to the State and Federal 
Governments. Jot-for-jot incorporation of a provision may entail greater 
protection of the right at issue and therefore greater freedom for those who hold 
it; jot-for jot incorporation may also yield greater clarity about the contours of 
the legal rule. In a federalist system such as ours, however, this approach can 
carry substantial costs. When a federal court insists that state and local 
authorities follow its dictates on a matter not critical to personal liberty or 
procedural justice, the latter may be prevented from engaging in the kind of 
 
 86. See also United States v. Carolene Prod., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1934) (concluding that 
heightened judicial scrutiny should apply to protect discrete and insular minorities). 
 87. Id. 
 88. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 741, 784–85 (2010). 
 89. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). There, the Court concluded 
that the Fifth Amendment’s public use requirement for eminent domain acquisitions is to be 
broadened to a public purpose requirement when evaluating a state and local government taking 
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Id. at 485, 487–89. 
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beneficent “experimentation in things social and economic” that ultimately 
redounds to the benefit of all Americans. The costs of federal courts’ imposing 
a uniform national standard may be especially high when the relevant regulatory 
interests vary significantly across localities, and when the ruling implicates the 
States’ core police powers.90 
While Justice Stevens refused to revisit the Court’s jurisprudence and 
incorporate the Second Amendment by way of the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause, he effectively outlines the problem with blanket jot-by-jot textual 
application of the Bill of Rights, including the Second Amendment, against state 
and local governmentsnamely, that it undermines the benefits of federalism 
to the detriment of individual liberty.91  
A more nuanced approach is required, especially since firearms are viewed 
so differently based on regional political culture differences, partisanship, and 
race. Justice Stevens writes: 
First, firearms have a fundamentally ambivalent relationship to liberty. Just as 
they can help homeowners defend their families and property from intruders, 
they can help thugs and insurrectionists murder innocent victims. The threat that 
firearms will be misused is far from hypothetical, for gun crime has devastated 
many of our communities. Amici calculate that approximately 1 million 
Americans have been wounded or killed by gunfire in the last decade. Urban 
areas such as Chicago suffer disproportionately from this epidemic of violence. 
Handguns contribute disproportionately to it. Just as some homeowners may 
prefer handguns because of their small size, light weight, and ease of operation, 
some criminals will value them for the same reasons. In recent years, handguns 
were reportedly used in more than four-fifths of firearm murders and more than 
half of all murders nationwide. Hence, in evaluating an asserted right to be free 
from particular gun-control regulations, liberty is on both sides of the equation. 
Guns may be useful for self-defense, as well as for hunting and sport, but they 
also have a unique potential to facilitate death and destruction and thereby to 
destabilize ordered liberty. Your interest in keeping and bearing a certain firearm 
may diminish my interest in being and feeling safe from armed violence. And 
while granting you the right to own a handgun might make you safer on any 
given day—assuming the handgun’s marginal contribution to self-defense 
outweighs its marginal contribution to the risk of accident, suicide, and criminal 
mischief—it may make you and the community you live in less safe overall, 
owing to the increased number of handguns in circulation. It is at least 
reasonable for a democratically elected legislature to take such concerns into 
account in considering what sorts of regulations would best serve the public 
welfare.92 
 
 90. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 869–70 (internal citations omitted). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 891–92 (internal citations omitted). 
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Justice Stevens then addressed the claim that the Framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment intended the nationalization of a personal right to firearms based on 
the systematic disarming of freedmen by recalcitrant state and local 
governments. Although he refused to revisit the Court’s failure to apply the Bill 
of Rights as against the states by way of the Clause, he correctly notes that the 
issue of the systematic disarming of racial minorities for oppressive purposes is 
better remedied by an equal protection claim than an expansion of purported gun 
rights under the Due Process Clause. Justice Stevens writes: 
I accept that the evolution in Americans’ understanding of the Second 
Amendment may help shed light on the question whether a right to keep and 
bear arms is included within Fourteenth Amendment “liberty.” But the reasons 
that motivated the Framers to protect the ability of militiamen to keep muskets 
available for military use when our Nation was in its infancy, or that motivated 
the Reconstruction Congress to extend full citizenship to the freedmen in the 
wake of the Civil War, have only a limited bearing on the question that confronts 
the homeowner in a crime-infested metropolis today. The many episodes of 
brutal violence against African-Americans that blight our Nation’s history do 
not suggest that every American must be allowed to own whatever type of 
firearm he or she desires—just that no group of Americans should be 
systematically and discriminatorily disarmed and left to the mercy of racial 
terrorists. And the fact that some Americans may have thought or hoped that the 
Fourteenth Amendment would nationalize the Second Amendment hardly 
suffices to justify the conclusion that it did.93 
The claim by gun rights enthusiasts that racial justice requires a broad 
personal right to firearms is belied by the fact racial minorities, including 
African Americans, tend to be more skeptical of gun rights than the white 
majority and by the fact that the African-American community, which was, at 
the time of Reconstruction, largely rural agrarian, has developed into an 
overwhelmingly urban one that does not perceive its rights as being closely tied 
to gun possession.94  
In short, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause should not be 
used as a vehicle to nationalize a personal right to firearms because: 1) the 
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment never intended the Bill of Rights to be 
nationalized against state and local governments via the Due Process Clause and 
actually intended for those and other rights to be incorporated via the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause; 2) the basis for increasing the scope of individual rights 
under the Due Process Clause, namely that they are rooted in our history, 
 
 93. Id. at 898–99 (internal citations omitted). 
 94. Ben Schreckinger, New CPAC Stars: Black Gun Rights Activists, POLITICO (Mar. 1, 2019), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/01/gun-rights-african-americans-1197153 [https://perma. 
cc/A8H6-KE6R] (“Opinion polling shows that black Americans view guns more negatively and 
are more supportive of gun control than whites and Hispanics.”). See also Badaracco, supra note 
41, at 793. 
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tradition, and practice belies any reason for the purported rights expansion 
because there is no need to encroach on democratic freedom when the individual 
rights involved are already rooted in practice; 3) firearms are inherently 
dangerous and tend to be lethally misused and therefore gun rights impose 
significant externalities; and 4) using the Due Process Clause to textually apply 
the Bill of Rights against the several states improperly undermines federalism to 
the detriment of individual liberty, which contradicts the entire basis for the Bill 
of Rights.  
V.  APPLYING THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE TO GUN RIGHTS 
CLAIMS 
A proper federal court evaluation of state and local government gun 
restrictions under the Clause should be based on a searching inquiry of local 
conditions that balances the individual’s need for self-defense against the 
broader need for protections against gun misuse. This nuanced approach, as 
opposed to a Due Process-based jot-by-jot incorporation of Heller as against 
state and local governments, would be true to the Framer’s intent and still 
provide for federalism’s benefits. If gun rights are too restrictive in view of the 
public’s lack of access to adequate and timely police protection, the federal 
courts should apply the Clause to require state and local jurisdictions to improve 
policing and/or facilitate access to firearms for self-defense purposes. Similarly, 
if racial minorities and other vulnerable groups are systematically denied access 
to weapons for self-defense purposes by illegitimate permitting and background 
check requirements, the federal courts are to invalidate these laws under the 
Clause.95 Under this approach, the City of Chicago’s handgun ban would have 
been invalidated based on its abject failure to reduce crime and violence, 
especially in racial minority communities.96 Conversely, jurisdictions that 
provide proper policing and that can demonstrate that historically oppressed 
communities have equal access to weapons are to be given broad discretion to 
impose gun restrictions for purposes of improving public safety.97 Such an 
approach is necessary because simply subjecting gun rights to state and local 
police powers, or even granting such rights only to militia-members, would 
 
 95. I am referring to typical state laws that disproportionately affect racial minorities, such as 
laws that preclude convicted felons from either voting or being licensed to own firearms. The 
federal courts should be empowered under the Fourteenth Amendment Clause to invalidate these 
laws on Second and Fourteenth Amendment grounds. 
 96. Shannon Antinori, FBI Crime Stats: Where Illinois Stands, PATCH (Oct. 1, 2018), 
https://patch.com/illinois/chicago/fbi-crime-stats-where-illinois-stands [https://perma.cc/3YNM-8 
JG9]. 
 97. Transcript of Scholar Akhil Reed Amar on Turning to the Constitution to Confront the 
Issue of Our Time, NPR: DIANE REHM SHOW (Sep. 13, 2016), https://dianerehm.org/shows/2016-
09-13/scholar-akhil-reed-amar-on-turning-to-the-constitution-to-confront-the-issue-of-our-time 
[https://perma.cc/ZQ75-VT3F]. 
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undermine the Framers’ goal of protecting all Americans from racial terrorism 
and other forms of illegal violence. Incorporating gun rights via the Clause 
would empower federal courts to undertake a searching inquiry into local safety 
conditions, including the predicament of historically marginalized groups, in 
evaluating the constitutionality of local gun restrictions and permitting 
requirements.  
To illustrate a potential result, rural states and economically distressed inner 
cities that struggle to provide adequate levels of public safety would be 
precluded from systematically disallowing gun permits because the Clause 
would guarantee citizens the right to self-defense by way of gun rights. By 
contrast, state and local governments that provide more than adequate levels of 
policing and public safety in a nondiscriminatory manner are to be given leeway 
under the Clause to restrict gun ownership and impose greater requirements on 
would-be gun purchasers because of the obvious risks of firearm misuse. The 
key here is that unlike the jot-by-jot incorporation of Heller by way of the Due 
Process Clause, my approach, premised on a beneficial understanding of 
citizenship that is respectful of federalism, allows gun rights to be contextualized 
to account for state and local conditions in their implementation. It has the added 
benefit of facilitating national cohesion in what is currently a very polarized 
republic by allowing states to be effective sovereigns, while recognizing the 
legitimacy of both sides of the gun debate.  
Ideally, it will force states to undertake necessary policies within their 
jurisdictions to minimize gun violence, such that states that demonstrate success 
in reducing violence will be allowed to implement gun restrictions. Conversely, 
states that systematically fail to reduce violence will have less leeway to deny 
citizens the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense purposes. This approach 
to nationalizing gun rights recognizes the importance many Americans attach to 
guns for self-defense and recreational purposes. It also takes note of the fact that 
the high likelihood of gun misuse leads many Americans to feel unsafe. By 
allowing states more latitude to implement gun restrictions, provided they are 
protecting public safety by implementing policies to protect urban and racial 
minority citizens and communities, my approach has the fortuitous benefit of 
encouraging states to undertake measures to actually reduce violence and the 
related problems of economic and social exclusion. It is also jurisprudentially 
restrained in that it would allow the federal courts to tailor the Clause’s 
requirement, namely the broadening of individual freedom, based on local 
conditions and not needlessly expand gun rights at the expense of Madisonian 
federalism.  
CONCLUSION 
Compared to other rich countries, Americans have an unusual love of guns. 
Though benevolently motivated, it imposes pronounced externalities on the 
broader public, including a staggeringly high rate of gun misuse. Nationalizing 
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gun rights via the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause will exacerbate 
polarization on the gun rights issue and undermine the federal judiciary’s 
institutional legitimacy. Because Supreme Court decisions should be evaluated 
according to their institutional legitimacy, their jurisprudential soundness, and 
how they will affect and interact with both the United States government and 
society, the Court’s Heller and McDonald decisions are altogether problematic 
uses of judicial review. They needlessly foretell a one-way ratchet of successful 
legal challenges to reasonable gun regulations that will eventually preclude state 
and local governments from effectively regulating guns as independent 
sovereigns. This is unfortunately what happened in the realm of reproductive 
rights, where polarization has grown so pronounced and rigid that a reversal of 
Roe or Casey will likely lead to a dramatic reversal on reproductive freedom for 
women in “red” states. A far better approach with respect to gun rights is to 
recognize the ambiguous relationship guns have to human freedom and instead 
apply gun rights by way of the Privileges or Immunities Clause and not the Due 
Process Clause. This would empower the federal courts to undertake a searching 
and proper inquiry as to local conditions in evaluating the constitutionality of 
local gun restrictions and still allow state and local governments leeway to 
effectively regulate guns based on local needs. This way, state and local 
governments that provide adequate policing and safety to their citizens will have 
greater latitude to enact measures to protect against suicide and other forms of 
firearm misuse. This approach will satisfy the Framers’ goal of enhancing the 
value of American citizenship and, perhaps, by depoliticizing the gun rights 
debate, strengthen the federal judiciary and engender national cohesion. 
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